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PETER VANNEMAN*

The Hierarchy of Laws in the
Communist Party-State System
in the Soviet Union t
Since the promulgation of the "Stalin" Constitution in 1936, the Soviet
political system has evinced an increasing tendency to systematize and
rationalize its legal sub-system; and an integral part of this process is the
gradual emergence of a complex hierarchy of laws.I
From a practical viewpoint, the prospect of mushrooming commercial
contacts between the U.S.S.R. and the West, and the concomitant expansion of
legal contacts, renders the problem of determining the procedure of one legal
act over another in the Soviet Union of increasing significance. 2
The tendency toward classifying Soviet laws is also relevant to Western
political and social scientists' efforts to analyze the processes of modernization
and institutionalization in the U.S.S.R.3 No comprehensive typology of Soviet
laws exists in Soviet or Western jurisprudential literature, although a few
limited classifications have been attempted.4 Soviet jurists avoid the problem
for political reasons; many Western analysts are mesmerized to some extent by
*J.D., Michigan (1966), and Ph.D., Penn. State (1972), Ass't Professor of Political Science,
International Law and Soviet Politics, University of Arkansas.
tThe research for this article was made possible through the intellectual and material assistance of
Dr. Vernon V. Aspaturian and the Soviet and Slavic Language and Area Center of the
Pennsylvania State University of which he is Director. It is derived from a larger work by Peter
Vanneman, entitled: The Supreme Soviet: Politicsand the Legislative Process in the Soviet System,
(Vol. 1, SAGE Series on Comparative Legislatures, 1974).
1H. J. Berman, Legality vs. Terror: The Post-Stalin Law Reforms, in G. M. Carter and A. F.
Westin (eds.), POLITICS IN EUROPE (New York, 1965), at 179-205; describes six major tendencies
characterizing law reform up to 1964, one being "systematization and rationalization of the legal
system as a whole."
'The literature on the legal and political aspects of commercial relations with the U.S.S.R. is
proliferating; a comprehensive work is SAMUEL PISAR, COMMERCE AND COEXISTENCE (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1970), at 417: in which the growing concern about the applicability of the substance
of Soviet Law is clear; "Eastern legislation does not always make clear whether substantive law
automatically governs foreign trade and maritime tribunals-a crucial matter for Western traders
inasmuch as a vast number of disputes in which they are involved are litigated in these tribunals.
'Political scientists are developing a mode of analysis for examining data on the Soviet political
system, called "tendency analysis"; see Franklyn Griffiths, A Tendency Analysis of Soviet PolicyMaking, in H. G. SKILLING and FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS, INTEREST GROUPS IN SOVIET POLITICS
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), at 335-77. An emerging hierarchy of laws is one
aspect of the tendency to systematize the legal system and as this article will demonstrate it also
facilitates the process of centralization which is the main political consequence of the process of
modernization according to the historian CYRIL BLACK, THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION, New
York, 1966.
'Some partial Soviet classification attempts are: A.I. Denison, Vazhnyi etap razitii Sovetskogo
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the absence of law in Stalin's system of rule by terror. 5
It is symptomatic of the relative decline of terror, and the embryonic
emergence of a more organic process of institutional development, that this
Western scholar may attempt to set out the hierarchy of Soviet laws in Tables 1
and 2, as described and analyzed thereafter.
Table I
a
Legal Acts of State Organs
Name of Actb

Issuing State Organ

Transliteration

Translation

Zakon

(Statute)

Acts of Supreme Soviet

Ukaz

(Edict)

Acts of Presidium of Supreme Soviet

Postanovleniac

(Decree

Acts of Council of Ministers

Rasporiazhenia

(Regulati o

Acts of Ministries

Prikaz

(Order)

Acts of State Committees

Reshenia

(Decision)

Acts of Local Soviets
Court Decisions

aMiscellaneous Legal Acts: instruktsiia and ukazanie, both translatable as "instruction," and
issued by Ministries and departments to regulate internal agencies or individuals. A prikaz
sometimes performs this function as well as other functions. A ustav is a charter, a polozhenie
regulates the scope and authority of a lesser state organ.
bThe legal nomenclature above applies to legal norms issued by Republic organs, but they are
restricted and subordinate in jurisdiction to acts of All-Union organs.
CPostanovleniaissued by all state organs. Usually, they are procedural rules dealing with internal
organization, although when issued by the Council of Ministers and local soviets, they usually have
substantive impact.

prava (VII U.N.), Moscow, 1960. For a rather sophisticated but brief exercise in legal classification,
see E.I. Koslova, Representative Organs of State Power in the U.S.S.R.: Rules of Procedure,
SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, 1 (1971), 85-90. For a brief summary see A.F. Shebanov, The
Various Forms of Soviet Law, SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO (1967), 22-31. A more detailed
but rather vague and ambiguous study is A.V. MITSKEVICH, AKTY VYSSHIKY ORGANOV SOVETSKOGO
GOSUDARSTVA (Moscow: 1967); O.N. Sadikov, General and Special Norms in Civil Law,
SOvETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, 1 (1971), attempts to clarify the distinction between broad
norms and detailed implementive laws. For a German effort see: W. Meder, Die Hierarchie der
Rechtsquellen in der Sowjetunion, OSTEUROPE-RECHT 2 (1956), at 167-75.
'The reluctance of Soviet jurists stems from the dual nature of law as both a restraint on arbitrary
rule and an instrument of rule. An unmesmerized exception is HAROLD BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE
U.S.S.R. (New York: Vintage, 1963), at 8: "A system of law and a system of force exist side by side
in the Soviet Union. . ... there are ... areas which even under Stalin were on the whole
governed by well-defined legal standards. The evidence tends to show a surprising degree of official
compartmentalization of the legal and the extralegal." While Berman sees a sphere of law and a
sphere of unlaw, generally American students of Soviet law tend to polarize into two mutually
exclusive schools, one of terror and one of law; see Zigurds L. Zile, On Law and Force: Fifty
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Table H
A Hierarchy of Soviet Laws
Legal Acts (PravovyeAkty) of Organs of
State Power and Administration
Osnovnoi Zakon (Basic-Fundamental Law)
Soviet Constitution
Constitutional Amendments (2/3 Vote of Supreme Soviet)
Zakon (Statute) (4 categories)
Of Supreme Soviet
Fundamentals of Legislation
Organic
Ordinary or Current
Ukaz Confirmed by Zakon
Ukaz (Edict) (3 categories; See Table III)
Of Presidium of Supreme Soviet
Postanovlenia (Decree)a
Of Supreme Soviet (Both Chambers)
Of Presidium of Supreme Soviet
Of Council of Ministers
Of Supreme Soviet (Individual Chambers)
Of Supreme Soviet Commissions (2 categories)b
predlozhenia (proposal)
recomendasia (recommendations)
Of Local Sovietsc
Of Courts
Rasporiazhenia (Regulation)
Of Council of Ministers
Of Ministries
Of State Committees and Boardsd
Of Mass Organse
Of Local Soviets
Reshenia (Decision)
Of Courts f
Of Local Soviets
aPostanovleniaof all state organs are usually acts regulating internal procedure, except those of
the Council of Ministers.
bFor the Normative impact of predlozhenia and recomendatsia see infra p. 77-78.
cLocal Soviets issue postanovlenia, rasporiazhenia, prikaz and reshenia. The latter is most
frequent.
dThese bodies sometimes issue legal acts called prikaz; their normative impact is in dispute.
eTheoretically, mass organs such as trade unions are not state organs, although, if authorized,
they may issue legal acts.
fTheoretically, Soviet courts merely apply law, they do not interpret it; thus, in theory, they do not
make it.
Years of American Scholarship on Soviet Criminal Law,
February 1970, at 194-217, esp. 215.
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The Nature of the Soviet Hierarchy
Hans Kelsen is perhaps the most maligned of Western legal scholars by Soviet
jurists for a whole host of reasons reflecting the theoretical nature of the Soviet
hierarchy of laws. 6 Soviet jurists reject his purely logical hierarchy of laws
because of its implication that law possesses an independent legitimating
authority of its own, distinct from that emanating from the Party or the
proletarianized masses. They reject his unsociological approach to law as
undermining the Marxist-Leninist sociological approach to jurisprudence.
Let us stress that this subordination of sources is not at all a logical scheme like
Hans Kelsen's "pure" normativist theory of law. The subordination of the sources 'of
Soviet law reflects the actual relationships between state organs with different
competence in the sphere of law-making. Each source of law occupies a place
corresponding to that which the organ creating the source holds within the system of
7
state organs.
Thus V. M. Chkikvadze, Director of the Soviet Institute of State and Law,
argues that the hierarchy of Soviet laws rests on the nature and place of the
institution in the system of state organs from which the legal acts issue; rather
than from a logical system of norms moving from the abstract to the concrete, as
Kelsen would have it.
The System of State Organs
The system of state institutions of the U.S.S.R., from which all Soviet law
emanates, is divided into two bureaucratic pyramids, the organs of state power,
which are the Soviets at all levels, headed by the Supreme Soviet of the
U.S.S.R.; and the organs of state administration, which are the Councils of
Ministers and Ministries at all levels, headed by the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R.8 The basic theoretical distinction is that the Supreme Soviets are
elected by the people, and thus embody a principle of popular sovereignty; while
the Council of Ministers are appointed by the Supreme Soviets, and are,
therefore, in theory, executive-administrative bodies.
In the hierarchy of laws, legal acts emanating from elective bodies are
superior in law to legal acts issued by the non-elective organs of state
administration at the same level-i. e. either the All-Union or the Republican
or the local level. There are other criteria of normative subordination, but it is
this criteria that is distinctive in the Soviet hierarchy of laws and distinguishes it
from Kelsen's.
For Kelsen, law is entirely autonomous and self-contained; and therefore, its
validity is not to be conceived in terms of any other extraneous system; it is not
distilled out of a socio-economic order or a system of state organs based on that
order as the Soviet legal order is. Analysis of the Soviet hierarchy of laws cannot
be divorced from its political context; the legal and political systems in the
U.S.S.R. are intimately intertwined.
'See HANS KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1955);
Kelsen outlines his position, reviews the evolution of Soviet legal theory and attacks his detractors.
V. M. CHKIKVADZE, SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968),
Eng. Ed., at 235.
'Konstitutsia (Osnovi Zakon) Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (The Constitution
of the U.S.S.R.), Izdatel' stvo "Iuridicheckaia Literatura," Moskva, 1966; on the Supreme Soviet
see Articles 30-56; on the Council of Ministers see especially Articles 56 and 64-70.
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The Party and State Organs:
The Sources of Legitimacy and Legality-Respectively
The source of Imperial Russian law was the Tsar, the divine interpreter of the
messianic orthodoxy of the church. Russian law derived its legitimacy from the
Tsar's special position in Russian history as symbol and voice of both political
and religious authority. 9 In other words, the Tsar was the source of both
legitimacy and legality; he was the sovereign power.
Legitimacy for Marx resided in a socio-economic class, the proletariat. For
tactical political reasons Lenin extended it to the peasantry, but argued that the
voice of this proletarian class was the Bolshevik Party. 10
The basic distinction is that the Party (CPSU), on the one hand, represents
social and historical legitimacy, stemming from its representation of the will of
the proletariat which has been pre-ordained by history to liberate mankind.
This really is a variation of divine origin, with history replacing God. On the
other hand, the state converts social legitimacy into legality; thus, in the Soviet
polity there is a clear distinction between legitimacy and legality. The Party
legitimates; the state legalizes.
In theory and practice, the Soviets distinguish between "supreme power,"
which is the ultimate lawmaking power (or sovereignty in Western
jurisprudence); and "supreme state power," which is the power to ratify or
confirm. 11
Legitimation of basic policy norms rests with the Party; their ratification and
conversion into legal norms is the role of the State. In practice the Party issues
policy directives through its Central Committee, and the appropriate state
organ converts them into detailed legal norms and ratifies them.
Controlling the Legal System:
The CPSU and Its Apparatus
The Party (CPSU) has always maintained firm control over the legislation and
administration of the law: 12
The control by the Marxist-Leninist party is the most important condition, and the
necessary prerequisite for the smooth operation of all state organs, and the principal
factor in the successful implementation of tasks facing them.13
'HAROLD BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., revised ed. (New York: Vintage, 1963), at 187-225,
n. 18, discusses the evolution of these concepts.
"0The "Stalin" Constitution of 1936 extended legitimacy to all the Soviet people on the premise
that they were imbued with a proletarian mentality; however, it simultaneously juridically sanctified
the role of the Party as leading core (Article 126) of all political institutions, including the
state. Thereby, implicitly, if not explicitly, emerged a latent ambiguity in the nature of Soviet
legitimacy. If society had imbibed the proletarian mentality en masse, why did it require a leading
core? Theoretically, Stalin had rationalized this ambiguity away by pointing to the foreign threat,
which necessitated continuing guidance of society by the Party during the period of capitalist
encirclement. A presumption of the unity of popular and Party wills remains the fundamental
underlying legal fiction in the Soviet legal system. Thus law is an expression of popular will as well
as the will of the Party.
"Vernon V. Aspaturian, The Soviet Constitutional Order, in MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEMS:
Europe, ed. by Roy C. Macridis and Robert E. Ward (3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), at 608.
2
Peter Vanneman, The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.: Politics and the Legislative Process in
the Soviet System, (SAGE SERIES ON COMPARATIVE LEGISLATURES, 1974), chapter IX.
'"Osnovy teorii gosudarstva: prava (THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE THEORY OF STATE AND LAW),
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The Party itself is controlled by an inner core of Party bureaucrats-the Party
apparat, who are the staff of all the higher organs of the Party machine.
This Party apparat overlaps and interlocks with the highest levels of the
legislative organs of state power and administrative organs of state
administration) pyramids of the state machinery. Almost all high officials of the
state are also high officials of the Party apparat,a device which has always been
the key practical instrument of the apparat's dominance of the Soviet legal and
political systems. 14
The Principles of Normative Subordination
in the Soviet Hierarchy of Laws
Since no Soviet authorities have established a precise hierarchy of legal
norms, Tables 1 and 2 represent an extrapolation from Soviet jurisprudential
literature of the sixties and early seventies, much of which is vague and
overlapping. 15 The tables classify Soviet legal acts (pravovye akty) according to
four principles of normative subordination:
1. The nature of the institutionalsource: organ of state power or organ of
state administration;
2. The form of the act itself general norm or administrative regulation;
3. The function of the act: substantive or procedural;
4. The geographicaljurisdiction of the act: all-Union, Republican or local.
The nature of the institutional source refers to whether it is elective or
non-elective; acts of the latter are subordinate to the former. The nature of the
act itself refers to whether it is a broad, general, fundamental norm or a detailed
administrative regulation; the former is superior to the latter. The function of
the act refers to the substantive-procedural dichotomy, the former being
superior to the latter. 16
The geographical jurisdiction of the act refers to the territorial extent of the
act's coverage, the broader an act's geographical coverage, the more superior
because of the principle of popular sovereignty-i. e., more people are subject to
the rule. These four principles establish the complex hierarchy of laws shown in
Tables 1 and 2.
SVERDLOVSK LAW INSTITUTE, Moscow, 1969, at 197-98.
"Peter Vanneman, op. cit. supra note 12 and Vernon Aspaturian, op. cit., supra note 11 at
613-18.
"See note 4 above. The major Soviet law journals are: (1) Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo, a
monthly journal ofthe Institute of State and Law of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Its substance
is political and social as well as legal, since political science does not exist as an academic discipline
in the U.S.S.R. (2) Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost, the organ of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court and
the Procuracy. (3) Sovetskaya Yustitsia (bi-monthly), promulgated by the RSFSR Council of
Ministers and Supreme Court. Both (2) and (3) deal primarily with procedural questions. (4)
Pravovedenize (bi-monthly), promulgated by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Higher and Secondary
Specialized Education. Its orientation is theoretical-jurisprudential. Two other valuable sources of
information on the development of Soviet law are the Zasedania Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR
(documentary record of sessions of U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta
SSSR (News of the Supreme Soviet), a bulletin of activities of the Supreme Soviet and its auxiliary
bodies.
"Koslova, op. cit., supra note 4, classifies rules of procedure according to four criteria: (a) the
sphere regulated; (b) importance of objective; (c) form; and (d) legal consequences. His effort
represents one of the more sophisticated attempts at legal classification.
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Forms of Legal Acts
The problem of classifying laws is an old one in Russian history, which Tsars
resolved by two fundamental classifications: Ukaz which were edicts or decrees
of the Tsar; and zakon which were great compendiums of previous edicts of the
Tsar.
In Soviet law, theoretically, a zakon is a fundamental normative act, but even
among Soviet jurists there remains the tendency to confuse merely collecting
laws with classifying them according to some relevant logical criteria.
Over 400,000 legislative acts and Government decisions, which have not yet been
systematically arranged, have been published since the USSR was established. Since
1927 the publication ceased not only of17a systematic collection of the legislation in
force, but even of a chronological one.
Stalin sought to juridically elevate the zakon (statute); and it emerged as a
fundamental law enacted through the Supreme Soviet exclusively, thus
distinguishing it to some extent from Tsarist zakon which were chiefly
codifications of previous decrees of the Tsar. The zakon was the highest
legislative act of state authority; it was normative, prescribing general rules,
seeking to achieve definite goals. 18
Most recent Soviet sources identify four basic forms of legal acts issued by the
highest organs of the state: zakon (statutes), ukaz (edicts), postanovlenia
(decrees or resolutions), and rasporiazhenia (regulations). A fifth form, the
prikaz, is issued by state committees, but its status in the hierarchy is unclear.
A sixth form, reshenia (decisions), is issued by local Soviets and the courts, but
not by the higher organs of state power and administration, which are the
sources of the four basic forms.
Only the Supreme Soviet itself may enact zakon. The Presidium of the Soviet
Supreme issues edicts (ukaz), which are often independent norms; and decrees
(postanovlenia), which are procedural regulations.
The Council of Ministers issues decrees (postanovlenia) and regulations
(rasporiazhenia),both of which are in the nature of administrative regulations,
although the latter (regulations) usually lack the quality of a legal norm. In
other words, rasporiazhenia (regulations) appear to be both substantive and
procedural. They emanate (one might say proliferate) from the Council of
Ministers, and also from the ministries, authorized mass organs and local
authorities.
The distinction between postanovlenia and rasporiazheniaat higher levels is
particularly fuzzy. The procedural-substantive dichotomy-often a thin line
even in Western jurisprudence-is even more vague in Soviet juridical
literature. In fact, its nature appears to have been seriously debated only in the
late sixties.
Several other forms of legal acts appear occasionally in Soviet juridical
literature, but do not properly fit into a hierarchy of normative subordination,
because they are internal acts, or acts of general reference which lack the quality
of a legal norm.
'V. M. Chkikvadze, Izvestia, September 7, 1965, at 1 and 3. For another example, see H. B.
Ahmetov, S. V. Baisalov, V. M. Levchenko, Kazakh SSR: Law Systemization, SOVETSKOYE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, 10 (1970).
"ANDREI VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE, trans. by Hugh Babb (New York:
MacMillan, 1948), pp. 337-38, 372, 376.
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Intruksiia and ukazanie, translated as instruction, are internal acts of the
Council of Ministers and Ministries. Terms of general reference are polozhenie
and ustov, translated as charter, which usually refer to a body of rules governing
a local government organization's procedures such as the local Soviets. Akt
refers to any legal act.
Let us turn now to a detailed description and analysis of Tables 1 and 2
setting out the hierarchy of laws according to the principles of normative
subordination, previously set forth.
ConstitutionalLaw ("Osnovnoi Zakon"):
The Basic or FundamentalLaw
In Soviet legal theory the Constitution stands at the pinnacle of any hierarchy
of laws. The Director of the Institute of State and Law of the U.S.S.R. Academy
of Sciences declares that: "The Constitution is the most important source of
Soviet law and the highest type of law." 19
Soviet constitutional law derives its importance, according to Soviet
authorities, from the fact that it sets out the main features of the social and state
system, defines the competence of state organs and the normative acts which
they may issue, sets out the fundamental principles underlying the power of
state bodies, and establishes the procedures governing modification of rules of
law in every branch of law.
On December 5, 1936, the Eighth Congress of Soviets adopted the
Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It can be amended by a
two-thirds vote of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet pursuant to Article 146; but few
major amendments have been passed. The two-thirds requirement has proved
to be a mere formality since the Supreme Soviet has approved all amendments
by a unanimous vote. The Constitution is referred to as the fundamental or
basic law, Osnovnoi zakon.
The Soviet constitution is a mixture of general principles and specific detailed
legislation. For example, changes in the industrial management apparatus
require a constitutional amendment-which is hardly in the nature of a general
principle of law. In fact, most amendments to the Constitution have related to
these economic reorganizations, which affects Articles 70, 77. and 78
concerning the structure of the Council of Ministers.
The prospect of a new constitution has been on the horizon for over a decade,
since 1962 when N. S. Khrushchev was appointed Chairman of a new
constitutional commission by the Supreme Soviet. His successor as head of the
CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, was elected in December 1964 to succeed Khrushchev
as Chairman of the constitutional commission also. On December 22, 1972,
Brezhnev announced that a new draft constitution will be ready in time for the
next Party Congress. 20
Statutes (Zakon): Statutes (zakon) are enacted through the Supreme Soviet
of the U.S.S.R. by a majority vote, although in fact only three non-unanimous
votes have ever been recorded in that body. 21
In 1936 the "Stalin" Constitution introduced a notion of popular sovereignty
into Soviet legal theory, located it exclusively in the Supreme Soviet, and
Op. cit., supra note 7, at 227.
"°Keynote U.S.S.R. Anniversary Izvestia, December 22, 1972, p. 1.
'Zasedania Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, First Convocation, first session, 1938, pp. 49-50; and 56.

"CHKIKVADZE,

2
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designated the statute (zakon) as the highest vehicle for expression of that
popular will. As Andrei Vyshinsky proclaimed:
In socialist society a statute (zakon) is the highest act of state authority, responsive to
the interests of the consciousness of the masses which augments the force of a Soviet
statute. In contrast to the ever-increasing part played in capitalist countries by
executive authority at the expense of legislative authority, the Stalin Constitution
emphasizes the22supremacy of the socialist statute as expressing the will of the sovereign
Soviet people.
Statutes may be divided into four categories constituting an implicit hierarchy
of zakon; according to implied legal precedence, they are:
1. Fundamentals of legislation;
2. Organic laws;
3. Ordinary or current legislation; and
4. Ukaz confirmed by zakon.
The fundamentals of legislation lay down the basic principles and institutions
of the legal system throughout the Union.
These fundamentals of legislation are authorized by Article 14 of the
Constitution; and the effect of passing many of these statutes over the decades
of the fifties and sixties has been to centralize the Soviet legal system
considerably, since all other legal acts must conform to the fundamentals.
The organic laws regulate procedures of state bodies as authorized by the
Constitution such as the elaborate procedure on the recall of Supreme Soviet
deputies pursuant to Article 142. The third category of zakon, current
legislation, deals with policy matters such as marriage or pensions-in the
common sense meaning of ordinary legislation.
As mentioned previously, the zakon derives its authority from the fiction that
it represents the will of the people, having been enacted by an elected,
representative organ of the people. In theory, all normative acts emanate from
the will of the people in the sense that their authority derives from zakon, to
which they must conform, and which embody the will of the people as enacted
by a representative body (the Supreme Soviet) for all of the Union. Authority to
issue other normative acts is in a sense delegated by the Supreme Soviet
pursuant to relevant constitutional provisions. 23
Acts of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet:
Ukaz and Postanovlenia
Although there is some debate among them, most Soviet jurists view the
norm-regulating activities of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet as authority
delegated from the Supreme Soviet. 24 The Presidium issues two kinds of
normative acts: edicts (ukaz), specifically authorized by Article 49 of the
Constitution; and decrees (postanovlenia), which are implied from Article 49 of
the Constitution and are in the nature of internal procedural acts.
2

p. 337.
supra note 12, chapter II.
4A proponent of the predominant delegation view is: L. Mandelshtam, Istina i domysly, Izvestia,
July 30, 1966, at 3. An opponent is G.V. BARABASHEV and K. F. SHEREMET, SOVETSKOYE
$TROITEL'STVO (Moscow, 1965), at 76-7. For a detailed analysis of the many legal positions on this
question as well as the political implications see Vanneman, op. cit., supra note 12 Chapter VIII.
VYSHINSKY. Op. cit.,
23
2 Vanneman, op. cit.,
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Table

M

A Hierarchy of Acts
of the Presidium of the S.S.
Ukaz (substantive)
3 categories
1. Ukaz: subsequently ratified by zakon.
2. Ukaz: concretizing zakon.
3. Ukaz: as independent legislation.
Postanovlenia (procedural)
Regulate internal procedure, awards, appointments, etc.
Ukaz actually set out behavioral norms and fall into three categories: first,
those which elaborate, concretize or fill in the details of Supreme Soviet
zakon-in effect, administrative regulations pursuant to Supreme Soviet
statutes; and second, those that are in effect new laws which must be ratified
subsequently by the Supreme Soviet.
Some Soviet jurists argue that the Presidium also has a third independent
power to issue ukaz without Supreme Soviet ratification. 25 However, this
violates the central juridical fiction that all law emanates from the will of the
people as expressed through acts of an elected representative body. The
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is elected by the Supreme Soviet, not the
people.
Ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which are later ratified by the
Supreme Soviet, may be thought of as a sub-category of current legislation
which is justified by its urgency (see Table II), or as a separate category of ukaz
(see Table III), according to Soviet rationale. The urgency argument as
expressed by the Director of the Institute of State and Law is that:
There is a specific group of statutes within the ordinary statutes group which, before
becoming statutes, had operated in another juridical form, namely, as decrees of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. The need to have the earliest possible
regulation of the important matters frequently arises in between the sessions of the
Supreme Soviet, in which case its organ, the Presidium which it elects, adopts a
normative decree. But because the promulgation of statutes is the exclusive
prerogative of the Supreme Soviet (Art. 32 of the Constitution), such decrees are
subject to approval by the following session of the Supreme Soviet, whereupon they
become statutes.26
Under the extraordinary conditions of World War II, the Presidium by ukaz
amended the Constitution, creating two commissariats. Again, urgency was
probably the underlying rationale although this practice embarrasses some
2

For example see, N. G. ALEKSANDROv et al.,
1963),
6 at 388-89.
1 Chkikvadze, op. cit., supra note 7, at
233.

OSNOVY TEORI1 GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA (Moscow,

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 8, No. 2

Hierarchy of Laws in the Soviet Union
Soviet jurists who are attacking it. 27 The majority of the jurists seem to view
ukaz which are later ratified by the Supreme Soviet either as the lowest category
of zakon; or the highest category of ukaz, as indicated in Tables II and III.
Postanovlenia(decrees), the second form of legal act issued by the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet, deal with internal organizational or procedural matters
enumerated in Article 49, such as: convening Supreme Soviet sessions, pardons,
appointments to high office, awarding medals, conducting referendums,
dissolving the Supreme Soviet, etc.
InternalActs of the Supreme Soviet
and Its Auxiliary Bodies
There are a multiplicity of internal legal acts issued by the Supreme Soviet
and its auxiliary bodies (cf. Table II)designed to accomplish one of two general
purposes: First, as described above, postanovlenia regulate the internal
organization and procedure of the state bodies; second, predlozhenia
(proposals) and recomendatsia (recommendations) facilitate fulfillment of the
norms laid down by zakon. If the acts involve major reorganization of the
Supreme Soviet, such as the 1967 statute on the commission system, they are
usually elevated to the status of zakon. 28
Postanovlenia may be issued by vote of both houses of the Supreme Soviet or
by an individual house. They are not usually substantive acts; they regulate
internal procedure and organization. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet may
also issue decrees regulating its own procedure and organization. Each decree
applies only to the body which enacts it.
A second category of internal acts are proposals and recommendations of
the commissions of the Supreme Soviet which usually lack the quality of a legal
norm. These acts are issued to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to the
Supreme Soviet itself, or to the Council of Ministers or to the individual
ministries. Their function is to point out inefficiencies or defects in the
fulfillment of norms established by zakon.
Normally, the acts are merely recommendations, which can be reviewed and
ignored by the bodies to whom they are addressed. 29 The authority to issue such
acts is implied from Article 51 of the Constitution which grants the Supreme
Soviet the power to create commissions for investigation and audit. The
Presidium may convert such recommendations into ukaz under the power of
concretizing zakon-that is, in effect, issuing a further administrative
regulation to facilitate the faulty implementation of a zakon which has been
uncovered by the commission's investigations.
A predlozhenia from the Supreme Soviet commissions to the Council of
Ministers is recommendatory unless converted to a ukaz by the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet. However, such a resolution to the ministries appears to be
legally binding and mandatory and must be carried out. Thus, a predlozhenia
of a commission of the Supreme Soviet to one of the sectoral ministries takes on
27

For example see: S. S.

KRAVCHUK, VOPROSY RAZVITIIA SOVETOV NA SOVREMENNOM ETAPE

(Moscow, 1966), pp. 41-48.
"Zasedania Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Sed'mogo sozyva, Third Session, Stenographic Report
(Moscow: 1967), pp. 415-424.
29bid., Article 23.
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the character of a binding legal norm, although they are primarily
investigatory in nature. 30
Another binding form of predlozhenia impliedly authorized by Article 51
(and perhaps Article 71), of the Constitution, requires the Council of Ministers
and the ministries to submit to the commissions all documents and materials
necessary to any audit or investigation of these bodies' activities in
implementing a zakon.
The 1967 zakon on the commission system further implements this
constitutional power, requiring an answer from the Council of Ministers and the
ministries within one month. Article 71 requires a verbal or written reply to a
deputy's inquiry within three days, but has been ignored until legally reinforced
by that same zakon. 31
Legal Acts of the Organs of State Administration
The organs of state administration are the councils of ministers and the
ministries, at all levels of government; and state committees, commissions and
boards. They are empowered by the Constitution (Article 73) to issue legal acts
in pursuance of zakon. In theory, such orders are administrative regulations
filling in the details for the implementation of the more general zakon.
On the basis of acts of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium the Council of
People's Commissars (now the Council of Ministers) of the USSR issues its orders and
directives. On the basis of all these acts, the People's Commissariats operate. The
orders and instructions of People's Commissariats are binding upon organs
subordinate to them. Thus an unbroken series of acts is here formed, each of which
has complete force insofar as it is issued in conformity with operative laws and the acts
of superior organs emanating therefrom. 32
Any acts of the organs of state administration are, in law, clearly subordinate
to acts of the organs of state power-both the zakon of the Supreme Soviet and
ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which represent the will of the
people as expressed through an elective representative body. Any act of an
organ of state administration contravening a zakon of the Supreme Soviet is
illegal and must be rescinded. It is not legally binding in theory.
The Council of Ministers issues two kinds of legal acts as authorized by
Article 66 of the Constitution. They are decrees (postanovlenia)and regulations
(rasporiazhenia). The former establish legal norms; the latter are usually
internal procedural acts. The postanovlenia of the Council of Ministers are in
the nature of administraive regulations, adding details to a general norm set out
in a zakon.
At least this is the theory. In fact, frequently they constitute new legislation
which may later be approved by the Supreme Soviet through tacit consent or
formal ratification. They are not procedural like the postanovlenia of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
The Council of Ministers also issues regulations (rasporiazhenia)which are
usually procedural in nature-that is, they concern the internal organization
and procedures of the government and do not set behavioral norms. Under
'°0 bid., Articles 21 and 24.
3
Ibid., Articles 21 and 22.
32
Vyshinsky, op. cit., note 7, at 370.
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Article 69, a regulation of the Council of Ministers may also annul regulations
of the ministries and suspend decrees and regulations of Councils of Ministers
of Union Republics. The ministries may also issue regulations under Article 73
which elaborate on zakon, ukaz or Council of Ministers' regulations or decrees,
but only within their sectoral sphere of jurisdiction.
Legal Acts of State Committees
The frequent reorganizations of the organs of state administration for
political or economic reasons have left the status of the acts emanating from
various state boards, commissions and committees somewhat unclear in the
hierarchy of laws. One Soviet jurist recently summarized the confusing picture:
Today there is no uniform form for the legal acts adopted by state committees. The

USSR Council of Ministers' State Committees on Labor and Wages, on Science and
Technology, and on Construction issue decrees [postanovlenia],the Supply Committee
issues regulations [rasporiazhenia], and the others issue their decisions as orders
[prikazi]. In practice, the issuance of orders by state committees creates serious
difficulties, inasmuch as that form cannot reflect the diversity of content of community
decisions, many of which are actually recommendations and are addressed to agencies
not within the system of the committee nor subordinate to it. Therefore state
committees, upon the issuance of decisions addressed to ministries and agencies, are
compelled to formulate them as minutes of committee meetings, or to circulate various
letters or instructions or to term their acts committee decisions.
In view of the practices of a number of state committees, it would be desirable to
establish in the general statute that committee decisions shall be in the form of decrees
(postanovlenie).... 33

Here again we perceive a concern for rationalizing and classifying legal acts
because a multiplicity of different forms-postanovlenia, rasporiazhenia, and
prikaz-emanate from the same type of government organ. The jurist above
appears to represent the generally accepted opinion that the postanovlenia is the
highest form of act issued by organs of state administration. Of course, since
state committees and boards are created by the Council of Ministers pursuant to
Article 68(f) of the Constitution, their acts are subordinate to those of their
creator.
NORMATIVE ACTS OF MASS ORGANS
The mass organs such as the trade unions, the Komsomol, etc., may also
issue acts which regulate behavior. They may be merely procedural regulations
governing membership and organization of the mass organ; and as such, they
are not legally binding. 34 However, the state may authorize mass organs to
issue acts which are legally binding. An example of this is the power of the trade
unions to interpret and apply labor legislation providing protection for laborers
and administering social insurance.
Such specific rule-making power must be specifically authorized by a state
organ. Thus, in theory, the rule-making powers of the mass organs, like all legal
acts, descend in theory from the fountain of legality, the Supreme Soviet. In
theory, this law-making power of the mass organs is in the nature of the
33

V. S. Pronina, Improving the System of Agencies in the USSR, Sovetskoye gosdarstvo i pravo,

8 (1968).
34

CHKIKVADZE, op.

cit., supra note 7, at 234.
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"concretizing" powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the organs of
state administration-that is, administrative regulations elaborating ultimately
upon a zakon.
LEGAL ACTS OF LOCAL STATE ORGANS (RESHENIA)
The local soviets and their executive committees join the systems of state
power and state administration at the base of the federal pyramids. They may
issue legal acts of a normative nature, just as Republic state organs may. The
acts are binding within the jurisdiction of the locality. Like all legal acts they
must, in theory, conform to the zakon of the Supreme Soviet. They concretize
and implement legislation at the'grass-roots, thus in theory, they are the final
link between the highest state organs and the people. Their form may be either
postanovlenia, rasporiazhenia or reshenia in that order of normative
subordination. The latter is most frequent.
LEGAL ACTS OF THE JUDICIARY (RESHENIA)
Placing the legal acts of the judiciary in the Soviet hierarchy is complicated by
the multiplicity of such acts, and the apparently evolving importance of the
judiciary, which has been traditionally a relatively unimportant state organ. The
Constitution (Art. 104) charges the Supreme Court "with supervision of the
judicial activities of the judicial organs . . . within statutory limits." The
Supreme Court may interpret zakon, but not the Constitution. The power of
judicial review rests in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In law, the
activation of the Supreme Court since 1957 suggests that the Party leadership
may view it as one potential instrument, among many, for monitoring the
norm-creating powers of the organs of state administration.
The term reshenia, employed herein, is a generic term referring to all of the
various legal acts of the Supreme Court and its three divisions. In practice, all of
them are subordinate to acts of state administration at the equivalent federal
level, since the organs of state administration have always been a major vehicle
for creating and concretizing legal norms. However, a conflict between the two
institutions, if not resolved secretly in party arenas, would be resolved legally by
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the highest judicial authority, which is
dominated by high Party officials.
The Supreme Court issues three major types of norms, which serve slightly
different functions as a general rule, but which. are difficult to place in a
hierarchy; they are: postanovlenia which are usually regulations of internal
procedure; opredelenie, which are substantive decisions; and guiding
explanations which advise lower courts on the application of legislation.
The role of judicial norms has always been relatively subordinate in a legal
system lacking judicial review, a system of precedent, and a doctrine of
separation of powers. Courts have also always remained somewhat dependent on
the powerful Prosecutor's Office (Procuracy). In practice the usual presumption
is that judicial acts are subordinate to acts of state organs at the same level.
Joint Acts and the Hierarchy
Most of the legal acts in our hierarchy have emanated from three important
institutions-the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the
Council of Ministers. There is another category of legal acts which aggravates
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 8, No. 2
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the problem of classifying Soviet legal acts even further.
Acts endorsed or signed by more than one institution have always played an
important role in the legal system. These multiple or joint acts emanate from
several combinations of institutions, which at first may appear somewhat
bewildering but, upon further examination, seem to conform to the principles
inherent in our previous hierarchy.
First of all, the Supreme Soviet does not participate in signing joint acts,
although it usually confirms them in the normal manner of ratifying a ukaz of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This maintains the facade of a rather
strict separation between the highest structure of legality, the Supreme Soviet,
and the structure of legitimacy, the Party, which the regime has always
fostered-but especially since Stalin's death.
After all, an important part of the law's utility to the Party apparat is the
extra increment of legitimacy imparted to Party directives which are confirmed
by zakon. If the distinctiveness of the Supreme Soviet as a separate structure of
legality becomes too blurred, this increment of legitimacy is lost. Therefore, the
Supreme Soviet is never one of the institutions signing joint acts, although in
most cases it does confirm them.
All major joint acts are issued by two or three of the following: the Central
Committee of the Party, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, representing the structures of legitimacy, executiveadministration, and legality, respectively. Triple joint acts are issued by all
three bodies, thus placing the seal of approval of three of the most important
political institutional structures on the act.
With the seal of the highest organ of legitimacy, the Party Central
Committee, and the highest organ of the executive-administrative apparatus,
the Council of Ministers, and one of the higher organs of state power on it, there
can be little doubt that such joint triple acts sit highest in the hierarchy of joint
legal acts. The rest of the hierarchy includes joint acts of the Party Central
Committee and the Council of Ministers, and joint acts of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers, as shown below in Table IV.
Table IV
A Hierarchy of Joint Acts

Triple:
(1) Party Central Committee, Council of Ministers, Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet
Double:
(2) Party Central Committee and Council of Ministersa
(3) Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers
aStrictly speaking, this joint act has no legal validity, and its use is declining. When it has been
used since Stalin's death, it usually refers to a zakon from which it derives its authority, which
legalizes it and is the essential rationale for its number 2 position in the hierarchy above.
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Triple acts are usually ratified by the Supreme Soviet, which clearly puts
them at the top of the hierarchy of multiple acts. The most famous instance of
this practice occurred at Stalin's death. Only the Central Committee and the
Council of Ministers signed the announcement of his illness; but his death
announcement, which was a legal event, was a triple decree endorsed by the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet also, as was the formation of the new
regime. 35
The act forming the new regime is an aberrant case, necessitated by the
extraordinary fear of internal disruption if the succession problem was not
immediately solved. It came very close to violating the Constitution, but
arguably it did not.
Although the Supreme Soviet alone is empowered to appoint the Council of
Ministers, most jurists agree that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet may act
in urgent cases until the Supreme Soviet is called into session for ratificationwhich it was within nine days. Thus, the triple decree appointing the
government, having been signed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and
later ratified by the Supreme Soviet, was not a violation of the spirit, at least of
the Constitution.
Double joint acts, of the Council of Ministers and Party Central Committee,
have an ambiguous legal standing in the hierarchy of the joint acts, unless they
refer to a zakon for their authority, which is increasingly the case. In Stalin's
day this was the exception, although one might argue that its legal standing
would not change, reference or not, because all legal authority in theory must
descend from zakon.
Despite their theoretical standing in the hierarchy, these joint acts often
constitute the most vital authority in the field (e.g., physical education and
sports); however, the increasing activity of the organs of state power may
gradually erase their importance.
These joint acts referring to a zakon raise the question of whether the Party
Central Committee (in theory the highest Party body) is subjected, from the
point of view of legal theory, to the Supreme Soviet by this reference to its zakon
as the source of authority.
Soviet jurists would probably argue that the Central Committee signature
represents only formal acknowledgment of the Party's guiding role in
formulating legislation-a role which is more or less understood even with
zakon. Thus, in no sense is Party subordination implied.
This fear of some inference of the Party being legally subordinate to any body,
probably is one reason why no joint decrees of the party and the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet have appeared. The other reason is that the overlapping and
interlocking of the personnel of the higher Party organs and the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet are increasing so that the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet acts more or less for the Party Central Committee in legal matters.
Thus, the third form of joint act, the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet and the Council of Ministers, is a sort of defacto triple decree in that the
Party Central Committee's endorsement is implied by the Presidium's
endorsement. We have placed it third in the hierarchy of joint acts because it
does not claim to derive its legal authority from a zakon; or its legitimacy from a
"Pravda, March.4, 1953, at 1; Pravda, March 6, 1953, at 1; Pravda, March 7, 1953, at 1.
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clear endorsement of the structure of legitimacy, the Party.
The Inverse Hierarchy:
Conversion of Lower to HigherNorms
An analysis of the hierarchy of Soviet laws should not ignore the implications
inherent in the practice of Soviet organs issuing acts which take normative
effect immediately and then are later ratified by higher organs. The process is
not totally unlike the practice in the United States where local and state acts are
tested in the higher courts to determine their conformity with the Federal
Constitution.
By a process of rationalizing, new meaning is often added to the literal
wording of the Constitution. In effect, local practice is tried, tested and
accepted or rejected. This is one fundamental aspect of an organic system of
law. In the United States, the courts play the leading role in the process.
This process of testing and incorporating lower norms into higher ones is
embryonic in the Soviet Union. The best example is the issuance of ukaz which
are then ratified by zakon. But another example is the issuance of acts by the
organs of state administration which usually cite the zakon which authorized
them.
The logical conformity of these acts to zakon is often arrived at only by rather
tortuous reasoning not unlike that sometimes found in the constitutional law of
the United States. As we have seen, even the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is
occasionally amended defacto by lesser bodies through acts which are then later
ratified by the Supreme Soviet.
This inverse hierarchy of legislating runs contrary to the logic of democratic
centralism, which is a bulwark of Communist Party-State systems, but is
characteristic of the growth of organic legal systems, and thus provides an
embryo worth watching.
UnpublishedLaws in the Hierarchy
A major reason for the apparently growing concern of Soviet jurists over the
problem of rationalizing the legal system is the vast body of unpublished laws in
the Soviet Union. For example, in 1965 only thirteen percent of the Council of
Ministers' postanovlenia were published and twelve percent of the R.S.F.S.R.
postanovlenia.
Even a few zakon are known to remain unpublished and are transmitted to
administrative agencies which they regulate in the form of an administrative
order known as prikaz. Not publishing laws is in fact itself legal, and there are
thirty known legal acts regulating the practice of not publishing laws.
One criticism of this practice of not publishing laws is that it subverts a
cardinal principle of the rule of law that every man is presumed to know the law.
One person is even known to have been sentenced to death for violating an
unpublished law.36 Legal scholars, as professionals, seem to be particularly
distressed by their lack of access to unpublished laws.
In effect, most postanovlenia and rasporiazheniaof the Council of Ministers
or ministries are for internal use by the agency they regulate, and are kept by
that agency in its archives and neither scholars nor the public have general
3
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access to them. 37 Since most zakon are published; and since only a tenth of
ukaz and almost no rasporiazhenia are of a normative character, the
postanovIenia of the Council of Ministers appear to be the chief source of
unpublished laws.
One estimate puts the ratio of zakon to ukaz to postanovlenia from 1945-1965
at 1:50:285. In other words, for every zakon there are fifty ukaz and 285
postanovlenia.38
Since most postanovlenia deal with regulation of the economy, one suspects
that criticism leveled at unpublished laws derives not only from citizens and
jurists worried about the rule of law and access to legal research materials, but
also from supporters of the economic reform which could hardly be facilitated
by legal obscurantism.
Any move from a command toward a market economy, where bargaining and
adjudicating between agencies is increased must suffer seriously from a
proliferation of internal, unpublished regulations.
Thus, one can imagine thejuriconsultants(a sort of in-house legal counsel) at
the enterprises being continually frustrated by lack of access to economic
regulations hidden in the archives of another agency. The following comment by
a juriconsultant in the Moscow Autoworks barely masks his irritation:
Legal advisers anticipate from the USSR Ministry of Justice the organization of
systematic legal information about the issuance, repeal and amendment of normative
documents.
It would be desirable to begin work to codify business legislation and to think out
the publication of methods and aids for the work of legal advisers .... 39
At the same time, the apparat of those organs of the Party and state
administration whose positions are threatened by the institutional reforms
implicit in the economic reform clearly benefit from exclusive access to relatively
secret laws.
Conclusion
The proliferation of enough Soviet jurisprudential literature to enable a
Western scholar to extrapolate this tentative hierarchy of laws for the Soviet
Union reflects to a degree the extent to which law has been sucked into the
vortex of politics there. Terror is the essence of unlaw; its decline has
crystallized somewhat amorphous factions and interest groups--each intent
upon promoting law for its own purposes.
There is little disagreement about expanding the sphere of law; only the
question of who controls the legal system and for what purpose remains a source
of political conflict. Analysis of that is beyond the scope of this study, which has
sought primarily to set out the apparent hierarchy that exists, and the accepted
40
rationale for its pyramid of normative subordination.
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